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REGULATION BY SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT:  
THE SEC AND INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS 
 
James J. Park* and Howard H. Park** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Like many other administrative agencies, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has significant power to regulate an important sector of 
the economy—in the SEC’s case, the securities markets. Critics of the SEC 
have claimed that at times it has engaged in “Regulation by Enforcement,” 
where it makes law through enforcement actions rather than by developing 
and passing clear rules.1 This argument has periodically surfaced with 
respect to some of the most important issues addressed by the SEC over the 
decades—insider trading,2 questionable foreign payments by public 
companies,3 and securities fraud.4  
The SEC has recently been faced with a new challenge, the sudden 
explosion of initial coin offerings (ICOs), which have raised billions of 
dollars through the sale of digital tokens.5 Over the last several years, 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. 
**  JD Candidate, UCLA School of Law Class of 2020.  
1. See, e.g., James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 
625, 637 (2007) (“The ‘Regulation by Enforcement’ critique reflects a general sense that norms are best 
initiated by rulemaking whereas enforcement actions should merely enact previously defined rules.”); 
see also WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 82-84 (1967) (noting criticism 
that rules are preferable to administrative opinions). 
2. Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at 
the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1990). 
3. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 146-59 (1982). 
4. Jonathan R. Macey, The Tenth Abraham L. Pomerantz Program: Wall Street in Turmoil: 
Who is Protecting the Investor? State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 128 
n.36 (2004) (“Rulemaking by enforcement refers to the presumptively illegitimate process by which 
regulators proceed with rulemaking ‘ex post,’ i.e. after certain conduct occurs, rather than through more 
legitimate formal notice-and-rulemaking procedures.”). 
5. An ICO listing site that relies on self-reporting notes that ICOs raised over twenty-one billion 
dollars in 2018 alone. Crypto Token Sales Market Statistics: 2018, All Types, COINSCHEDULE, 
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promoters routinely distributed investments to investors through ICOs 
without filing the registration statements typically required for the sale of 
securities to the public. Blockchain technology facilitated the ability of 
entrepreneurs to easily sell tokens to numerous investors, who receive a 
secure digital record of their purchase.6 ICOs for a time exceeded venture 
capital in funding startup companies.7 It was conceivable that ICOs could 
disrupt a well-established regulatory scheme requiring disclosure when new 
businesses raise funds from the public.8 
Even when a token is clearly an investment, the SEC only has jurisdiction 
to regulate it if it is a security.9 Before ICOs, the definition of a security was 
periodically defined on a case-by-case basis in litigation involving 
investments backed by unusual assets such as pay phones or chinchillas.10 
In these cases, courts typically ask whether an investment is a security under 
the Supreme Court’s Howey test.11 If it is an investment contract under that 
doctrine, it is a security subject to SEC disclosure and anti-fraud 
requirements. If it is not, securities law does not provide the SEC a basis for 
regulating the transaction.      
The key question in applying the Howey test is whether the investment is 
in a business venture whose profitability depends on the efforts of “others.” 
These “others” could include formal corporate managers or individuals with 
 
 
https://www.coinschedule.com/stats/ALL?dates=Jan+01%2C+2018+to+Dec+31%2C+2018 
[https://perma.cc/NP3P-U6ZG]. 
6. In general, the term “coins” refers to cryptocurrencies that can operate as stand-alone 
platforms, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Most ICOs utilize “tokens” which are crypto-assets that are 
dependent on a coin platform. 
7. Arjun Kharpal, Initial Coin Offerings Have Raised $1.2 Billion and Now Surpass Early Stage 
VC Funding, CNBC (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:17 AM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/09/initial-coin-
offerings-surpass-early-stage-venture-capital-funding.html [https://perma.cc/W92Z-38B7]. 
8. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 
YALE J. ON REG. 735, 744-47 (2019) (arguing that ICOs and other fintech developments are undermining 
the “New Deal settlement” for finance concerning the “optimal balance of private freedom and public 
control in the financial market”). 
9. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2018) (requiring registration of 
securities). 
10. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004) (finding leaseback contracts involving 
payphones were securities); Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding 
chinchilla breeding scheme involved an investment contract). 
11. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). Howey provides that “an investment 
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] 
invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts 
of the promoter or a third party.” Id. at 298-99. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/11
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less defined roles. Investment in a security is distinguished by the need to 
assess the competence and honesty of such “others.” The possibility that the 
investment will rise in value through market forces is not enough. After all, 
fortunes have been made by owners of assets such as art, gold, and oil, yet 
none of those investments are securities.12 
In addressing when an ICO sells a security, the SEC had little choice but 
to proceed through Regulation by Enforcement.13 The Howey test is 
deliberately vague and reflects the broad definition of “security” passed by 
Congress.14 There is no simple rule or formula that can easily resolve close 
cases.15 On the other hand, aggressively penalizing the pioneers developing 
the latest transformative technology would risk sparking criticism that SEC 
regulation squelches valuable entrepreneurship.16 
The SEC thus proceeded through what this article calls “Regulation by 
Selective Enforcement.” Rather than bringing many enforcement cases 
seeking penalties (as it could have, given the sheer number of noncompliant 
ICOs17), the SEC has brought only a handful of carefully chosen significant 
actions. The SEC initially did not seek sanctions in ICO cases, giving the 
industry time to adjust, and perhaps increasing the chance that early cases 
 
 
12. Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980). 
13. Indeed, the SEC’s efforts with respect to ICOs have been characterized as Regulation by 
Enforcement. See, e.g., Wells Submission of Kik Interactive, Inc. and the Kin Ecosystem Foundation at 
3, In re Kik Interactive, No. HO-13388 (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.kin.org/wells_response.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U22F-Y2J7]; Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial 
Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 512 (2019) 
(“Regulation through enforcement is necessarily piecemeal and incremental.”); see also Recent 
Guidance, SEC, Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
2418, 2422 (2019) (“Through selective enforcement of the most egregious fraud cases, the SEC has 
prevented judges from interpreting the application of securities laws to digital assets, leading to vague 
and nebulous regulation.”). 
14. Securities Act of 1933 § 2 A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (2018). 
15. At least initially, there was sufficient ambiguity about whether ICOs involved securities for 
ICO promoters to credibly claim that they did not intend to break the law. Cf. Elizabeth Pollman & 
Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017) (describing startup 
companies with business plans based on challenging current regulations). 
16. As Professors Brummer and Yadav observe, it is difficult, if not impossible, for regulators to 
construct a framework that achieves clear rules, market integrity, and financial innovation. See Chris 
Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019).  
17. See, e.g., Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, SEC (Dec. 
11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 
[https://perma.cc/U24W-E9E5] (noting that ICOs typically involve sale of securities and that no ICOs 
had been registered with the SEC). 
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would settle rather than be litigated over a lengthy period. Over time, the 
SEC built a foundation of legal guidance applying Howey to specific cases 
with little court intervention.    
While the SEC’s enforcement is inherently selective because it does not 
have the resources to pursue every violation, the SEC’s effort with respect 
to ICOs was distinctively selective because it left some significant 
violations of the securities laws unaddressed. Not all insider trading and 
securities fraud cases spur an SEC action, but such malfeasance is typically 
hidden and requires substantial effort to uncover.   
Regulation by Selective Enforcement was possible in part because the 
SEC is not the only enforcer of the securities laws.18 Private parties, for 
example, have powerful remedies when they purchase an unregistered token 
that turns out to be a security. They have the right to rescind the transaction 
under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 if it does not fall within an 
exemption to the registration requirement.19 Because security purchasers 
can enforce the securities laws, the SEC can devote its limited enforcement 
resources to the most important cases while allowing most investors to 
exercise self-help. In addition, state securities regulators independently 
brought many cases targeting ICOs, protecting investors without the 
resources to bring a suit.20  
 The SEC’s Regulation by Selective Enforcement strategy has been 
successful in establishing the agency’s authority over ICOs—and has done 
so with limited involvement of the courts. The SEC has moved decisively 
with these cases, considering their complexity and its reputation for taking 
years to resolve enforcement matters.21 At the same time, it has been 
thoughtful in applying the law to a new setting. The SEC’s various 
enforcement releases have effectively communicated basic parameters to 
 
 
18. As one of this Article’s authors has written elsewhere, the various enforcers of the securities 
laws can play distinct roles. James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the 
Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012). 
19. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (2018). 
20. On the role of state securities regulators in protecting retail investors, see Carlos Berdejó, 
Small Investments, Big Losses: The States' Role in Protecting Local Investors from Securities Fraud, 92 
WASH. L. REV. 567 (2017). 
21. See, e.g., Park, supra note 18, at 147. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/11
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the industry with respect to when ICO tokens are securities.22 As a result, 
the number of unregistered ICOs available to U.S. investors has quickly 
declined.23 
On the other hand, a danger of Regulation by Selective Enforcement is 
that it can create the illusion that the major legal issues have been resolved, 
when there is still a great deal of uncertainty as to when a token is a security. 
The SEC’s settlement releases only represent the agency’s view that a 
particular token was a security. Though administrative interpretation of a 
statute is entitled to some weight,24 courts may still disagree. Some of the 
SEC’s most important ICO cases have turned on fine distinctions. Slightly 
different facts could merit different results. Yet the SEC has acted at times 
as if the issue of when a token is a security has been so clearly resolved that 
subsequent violations deserve significant sanction. Such a position is 
troubling. 
Another danger is that by only bringing cases against more recent ICOs, 
the SEC risks conferring monopoly power to early movers. The ICO of 
Ether, the token associated with the Ethereum smart contracts platform, at 
least initially was the sale of a security, but the SEC has taken the position 
that Ether is no longer a security. Ethereum thus has a significant advantage 
over newer smart contract platforms that will have to comply with SEC 
regulation.  
The challenge of responding to ICOs illustrates the difficulty of 
regulating innovation. For the most part, the SEC has effectively applied old 
 
 
22. For an analysis of the ways administrative guidance can influence private parties, see Blake 
Emerson, The Claims of Official Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 
2122, 2156-63 (2019). 
23. ICO numbers dropped from 674 successful ICOs in the first half of 2018 (with 84 based in 
the U.S.), to 379 in the second half of 2018 (with 33 based in the U.S.), down to 94 successful ICOs in 
the first half of 2019 (with 7 based in the U.S.). Crypto Token Sales Market Statistics, supra note 5.  
Much ICO activity originates outside the United States. In one case involving a Canadian ICO that 
had some U.S. investors, the SEC acknowledged a $520,000 penalty levied by Canadian securities 
regulators in imposing a smaller penalty of $25,000. See Nextblock Global Ltd., Securities Act Release 
No. 10638, 2019 WL 2103138 (May 14, 2019). The SEC also levied a penalty of $24 million for an 
unregistered ICO involving an offshore company that marketed the ICO to U.S. investors and did not 
adequately prevent U.S. investors from purchasing tokens. See Block.one, Securities Act Release No. 
10714, 2019 WL 4793292 (Sept. 30, 2019). 
24. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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legal standards to a new problem.25 Though it should be congratulated for 
its work, the SEC should not assume that its Regulation by Selective 
Enforcement program has completely resolved the legal issue of when a 
token is a security. 
 
I. THE MECHANICS OF ICOS 
 
The unprecedented success of the ICO in raising funds can be partly 
attributed to its efficiency in distributing digital assets. The value of a token 
is far from certain, but an investor in a reputable token has some confidence 
that his purchase has been documented in a rigorous manner.26 Rather than 
rely on a paper stock certificate that can be forged or lost, blockchain 
technology permits entrepreneurs to create a secure record of token 
transactions.  
ICOs essentially create a set of smart contracts between the investor and 
a project.27 One ICO contract governs the exchange of some consideration 
for the token. Another ICO contract may give the token purchaser the right 
to access a service, often in the future when it becomes functional. Just as a 
corporate charter can be likened to a contract between shareholders and the 
corporation,28 an ICO establishes a contractual arrangement between the 
token purchaser and a project.29 Unlike a corporate contract, ICO smart 
contracts are self-executing and thus could better protect the rights of token 
purchasers. 
 
 
 
25. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Tulips, Oranges, Worms, and Coins—Virtual, Digital, or 
Crypto Currency and the Securities Laws, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH 493, 526 (2019) (arguing that decisions 
finding that “initial coin offerings involve an offering of securities . . . are headed in the right direction.”). 
26. Of course, the promoter could simply lie and never create a smart contract program that 
would record the transaction.  
27. For an overview of smart contracts and ICOs, see Nareg Essaghoolian, Initial Coin Offerings: 
Emerging Technology’s Fundraising Innovation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 294, 306-14 (2019). 
28. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 1325, 1327–28 (2013) (“The contractarian logic is clearest at the point of a company’s initial 
public offering (IPO).”). 
29. Many ICOs publish a white paper describing the features of this relationship. One study finds 
that ICOs with a white paper are more likely to increase employment and are less likely to fail. See 
Sabrina T. Howell, Marina Niessner & David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with 
Cryptocurrency Token Sales 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24774, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3201259. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/11
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A. Securities Transactions and Trust 
 
When investors buy stock in a public company today, they do not receive 
a physical document. Instead, a record of the transaction is made in a ledger 
kept by a third-party depository institution that holds the stock on behalf of 
its owner.30 When the investor sells the stock, the depository institution 
makes adjustments in the ledger to reflect the change in ownership. Thus, 
stock transactions are not like the exchange of currency where physical bills 
go from one party to another.  
This system replaced a system where paper stock certificates were 
transferred from person to person. The problem with relying on physical 
evidence of ownership was that it became difficult to keep track of the 
certificates. While there may have been comfort in receiving an official 
company document representing a share of stock, there was a risk that such 
a document could be misplaced. One journalist writing in the early 1970s 
described the dangers to investors associated with the transfer of stock 
certificates:    
 
Not infrequently he was sent the wrong stock; when he 
was sent the right certificate, it arrived late. Often he would 
not receive it at all. If he left his stock in a Street name— 
with his broker—there was a good chance he would never 
receive his dividends – a sure sign that there was no record 
of ownership at his broker’s office. . . . If he was unlucky 
enough to die his securities, dividends and cash might well 
be kept by the broker instead of being delivered to the 
proper authorities to be held for the investor’s heirs.31  
 
Just a few decades ago, the securities industry had not resolved the basic 
concern that an investor’s stock purchase could be stolen or lost. ICOs have 
rightly been criticized for their potential for fraud,32 but it is important to 
 
 
30. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 
232-35 (2018) (describing creation of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, which holds stock 
ownership records). 
31. CHRISTOPHER ELIAS, FLEECING THE LAMBS 8 (1971). 
32. See, e.g., Shane Shifflett & Coulter Jones, Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wannabes 
Show Hallmarks of Fraud, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2018, 12:05 PM), 
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remember that not too long ago the system for transferring traditional 
securities was not completely reliable.    
Blockchain technology, which was first widely used in connection with 
the virtual currency Bitcoin,33 can be understood as a natural extension of a 
world where transactions are increasingly just entries recorded in an 
electronic ledger. Rather than relying upon a single ledger, with blockchain 
an ownership record can be memorialized in multiple digital ledgers. 
Whenever a new transaction occurs, a decentralized network of “miners” 
will compete to verify the validity of the transaction by solving an arbitrary 
mathematics problem.34 Once a transaction is verified, it is added as a block 
that is connected to a chain of prior verified transactions, hence the term 
“blockchain.”35 Importantly, the miner that is the first to confirm a 
cryptocurrency transaction receives compensation in the form of that 
cryptocurrency.36 For example, a Bitcoin miner will receive Bitcoin for 
verifying a transfer of Bitcoin. This incentive is necessary because solving 
the math associated with a transaction requires significant computer 
processing power that uses expensive hardware and electricity.37  
ICOs utilize blockchain technology to address the basic problem that a 
stock purchaser must trust that his funds have purchased an investment. 
While this is not typically a problem for public companies, where a 
reputable third party records the transactions, it could be an issue for some 
 
 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-beware-hundreds-of-bitcoin-wannabes-show-hallmarks-of-fraud-
1526573115 [https://perma.cc/GQF9-Z58C]. 
33. For an overview of blockchain technology, see PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, 
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018). 
34. Anyone with a sufficient computer and internet connection can be a miner for networks like 
Bitcoin, Download Bitcoin Core, BITCOIN CORE, https://bitcoin.org/en/download 
[https://perma.cc/G5MY-3FH6], or Ethereum, Download Geth, GO ETHEREUM, 
https://geth.ethereum.org/downloads [https://perma.cc/7UUQ-4SVL]. 
35. The Bitcoin protocol dictates that the longest known blockchain is the authentic copy. 
Because each link requires solving a problem, the longest blockchain has also had the most 
computational work put into it. This means that the security of the decentralized ledger can be maintained 
as long as no one gains the majority of the computer processing power because they would be outpaced 
by the rest of the network. This form of security is known as a proof-of-work system. See SATOSHI 
NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 3 (2008) 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XXJ-XUTL]. 
36. Id. at 4. 
37. The electrical power required to maintain the Bitcoin network has been compared to that of 
a small country. Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, DIGICONOMIST, https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-
energy-consumption [https://perma.cc/P9JR-BWW7] (tracking Bitcoin’s estimated power usage and 
finding that it currently resembles that of Austria). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/11
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private companies. A private company has the option of issuing physical 
stock certificates, or it can record the transactions in a ledger it maintains.38 
While an investor can trust a reputable private company to accurately and 
honestly record a transaction, not all start-up companies are trustworthy. 
With blockchain technology, an investor in a new venture can receive some 
additional assurance that transactions in a digital asset are accurately and 
securely memorialized.39  
 
B. ICOs as Smart Contracts 
 
Unlike Bitcoin, an ICO is somewhat more complicated than the simple 
transfer of an asset to an investor. Because a token is more than a basic 
currency, code must specify the various functions associated with the token. 
An ICO creates various smart contracts that define the relationship between 
the token holder and the blockchain project.40 Just as stock confers rights to 
the shareholder, a token confers rights to the token holder. Rather than 
specify such rights in a written corporate charter, blockchain enables those 
rights to be memorialized in the code that creates the digital asset.  
Most ICOs use Ethereum, a blockchain platform that offers users the 
ability to construct smart contracts permitting access to various applications 
programmed onto the platform.41 Smart contracts can be set up so that a 
 
 
38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 158 (2019) (permitting uncertificated shares). 
39. For an overview of the various implications blockchain recording of stock transactions can 
have for corporate law, see Geis, supra note 30. 
40. For example, one ICO described a set of four smart contracts: 
The main contract is called ‘DAO’. It defines the inner workings of the DAO 
and it derives the member variables and functions from ‘Token’ and 
‘TokenCreation’. Token defines the inner workings of the DAO Token and 
Token-Creation defines how the DAO token is created by fueling the DAO with 
ether. In addition to these three contracts, there is the ‘ManagedAccount’ contract, 
which acts as a helper contract to store the rewards which are to be distributed to 
the token holders. . . . The contract ‘SampleOffer’ . . . is an example of what a 
proposal from a contractor to the DAO could look like. 
Christopher Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance 3 (2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy). 
41. White Paper: A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application Platform, 
GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper [https://perma.cc/84LK-XWPM] 
(describing Ethereum as “the ultimate abstract foundational layer: a blockchain with a built-in Turing-
complete programming language, allowing anyone to write smart contracts and decentralized 
applications. . . .”). For a tutorial on deploying smart contracts on Ethereum, see Mercury Protocol, How 
to: Deploy Smart Contracts onto the Ethereum Blockchain, MEDIUM (Dec. 21, 2017), 
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digital ledger documents events that trigger contractual obligations. When 
an investor sends a digital asset to an account, that action creates an 
obligation to send a token to that investor. Moreover, when an investor 
decides to use a token, the investor can send the token to a digital address 
to trigger access to some service. Smart contracts can automatically fulfill 
various obligations without human intervention.42 
Like Bitcoin, Ethereum requires miners to verify transactions that are 
recorded on a digital ledger.43 Such transactions can be initiated through use 
of a cryptocurrency called Ether. The payment of Ether is necessary for 
individuals who want to use Ethereum to set up a smart contract. Whenever 
verification is necessary with respect to an Ethereum smart contract, the 
party wishing to execute the contract must pay an Ether transaction fee to 
the miners. Without such a fee, there would not be sufficient incentive for 
third parties to spend computing time and resources to verify the transaction. 
Ether is often described as the “gas” that permits the Ethereum blockchain 
to function.44 The price of Ether thus depends largely on the underlying 
demand for creating and using smart contracts on Ethereum.45 
The first step in an ICO on a platform like Ethereum is to open an account 
that permits the user to code various smart contracts.46 Such an account can 
be used to create a token, which is essentially a digital record that can be 
programmed with various features. Perhaps the most basic aspect of such a 
token is that it can be transferred from one user to another.  As the Ethereum 
White Paper explained, “a currency, or token system, fundamentally is a 
database with one operation: subtract X units from A and give X units to B. 
. . .”47  
 
 
https://medium.com/mercuryprotocol/dev-highlights-of-this-week-cb33e58c745f 
[https://perma.cc/GYE7-D3ZL]; see also Ethereum Mist Readme, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/ethereum/mist/releases [https://perma.cc/7TPA-EXTF].  
42.  See, e.g., White Paper: A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application 
Platform, supra note 41 (describing smart contracts as “systems which automatically move digital assets 
according to arbitrary pre-specified rules.”). 
43.  See id. 
44.  See, e.g., id. at 13 (describing Ether as “the main internal crypto-fuel of Ethereum . . . used 
to pay transaction fees.”). 
45.  In addition, the supply of individuals willing to mine Ether will also affect the price. 
46.  See, e.g., White Paper: A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application 
Platform, supra note 41, at 13. 
47.  Id. at 19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/11
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The Ethereum Foundation provides a basic token format called ERC20 
that provides token creators with a standard form that can be tailored to each 
project’s needs.48 The ERC20 standard is governed by several mandatory 
rules. It has a standardized method for token creators to set their token’s 
names and symbols.49 It requires that a token user be permitted to look up 
the total token supply and the token balance of any particular user.50  When 
an ERC20 token is transferred, such “transfer events” must be broadcasted 
to other users of the network.51 The ERC20 standard also provides for a 
number of optional functions that the creator can choose to implement. For 
example, a token creator can specify methods of generating new tokens or 
removing tokens from circulation.52 
When the ICO is ready to launch, another smart contract can govern the 
process by which the token is sold. For example, a contract can specify the 
price of the token. It can specify how many tokens will be distributed. It can 
set a minimum funding goal that must be met before the ICO proceeds 
become available to the ICO venture.53   
Finally, a smart contract can govern the services that can be accessed by 
the token holder. For example, an individual could purchase a token that 
allows access to the image of a unique cartoon kitten.54 The CryptoKitties 
token is programmed with unique characteristics concerning a kitten’s 
 
 
48.  Fabian Vogelsteller & Vitalik Buterin, ERC-20 Token Standard, GITHUB (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md [https://perma.cc/UDW4-H65G]. 
49.  Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. See OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/…/ ERC20Mintable.behavior.js, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-
contracts/blob/489d2e85f10c68ff977bdd983360b361c4422423/test/token/ERC20/behaviors/ERC20Mi
ntable.behavior.js [https://perma.cc/7UQ6-LA9B] (example of ERC20 code which adds the ability to 
create new tokens through a “minting” function). See also OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-
contracts/…/ERC20Burnable.behavior.js, GITHUB, https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-
contracts/blob/489d2e85f10c68ff977bdd983360b361c4422423/test/token/ERC20/behaviors/ERC20Bu
rnable.behavior.js [https://perma.cc/7Z7J-Z3JP] (example of ERC20 code which adds the ability to 
remove tokens from circulation through a “burning” function).  
53. For an overview and empirical analysis of such provisions in ICOs, see Shaanan Cohney, 
David A. Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David A. Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 591 (2019). 
54. CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co (last visited July 28, 2019). 
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appearance and breeding characteristics.55  Owning the token gives the user 
the right to view a website that shows images of the CryptoKitties.  
In addition to the creation of digital kittens, tokens could provide access 
to services provided by a more ambitious business venture.56 One proposed 
project would set up a cloud computing network “allowing users to ask 
others to carry out computations and then optionally ask for proofs that 
computations at certain randomly selected checkpoints were done 
correctly.”57 A token essentially would give the user the ability to pay for 
computing services provided by a decentralized network. 
While smart contracts provide investors with security with respect to 
some issues, they do not provide complete security with respect to the value 
of a token. Even if a token can be programmed to automatically access a 
service, the smart contract does not ensure that the service will be built and 
widely used. Blockchain projects require investments of time and money to 
eventually function. If a project does not succeed in creating a valuable 
service, the token associated with the project will be essentially worthless. 
ICOs are thus structured in a way that addresses some but not all of the trust 
issues inherent in investing.   
 
II. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO ICOS 
 
The unprecedented fundraising success of ICOs was made possible by a 
system that provided investors with comfort that their transactions would be 
securely recorded. Bitcoin showed that transfers could be reliably 
memorialized on a digital ledger.58 Because Bitcoin rose astronomically in 
value as it became more widely used, investors reasoned that ICO tokens 
could follow a similar path. 
 
 
55. More specifically, it is an ERC721 non-fungible token. See Technical Details, 
CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/technical-details (last visited July 28, 2019) (technical 
details for CryptoKitties stating ERC721 usage). 
56. Sudhir Khatwani, Top 10 Cryptocurrencies With Practical Use Cases, COINSUTRA (Oct. 13, 
2018), https://coinsutra.com/cryptocurrencies-practical-usecases/ [https://perma.cc/Q9BH-M6XX]. 
57. See, e.g., White Paper: A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application 
Platform, supra note 41, at 25. 
58. See generally Bitcoin Price Chart (BTC), COINBASE, 
https://www.coinbase.com/price/bitcoin [https://perma.cc/EB3G-8SMV] (Bitcoin’s market 
capitalization valued at $167.2 billion as of Oct. 27, 2019). 
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Because the SEC did not regulate Bitcoin as a security,59 there was hope 
that tokens could also avoid classification as securities. A token differs from 
Bitcoin because it permits access to some service that is often developed 
using the funds raised from the sale of the token. But if the token is 
essentially the pre-purchase of a service, it might not involve the type of 
investment that would be considered a security. Just as the advance purchase 
of a video game that may or may not be developed is not a purchase of a 
security, the advance purchase of tokens that will be used on a platform that 
may or may not be developed might not be the purchase of a security.  
There were thus nontrivial arguments that needed to be resolved with 
respect to the status of ICO tokens. Securities laws passed in the 1930s did 
not anticipate the sale of tokens recorded on digital ledgers, but they did 
anticipate that securities could take many forms. The question was whether 
the tokens sold through ICOs were currencies like Bitcoin or securities 
subject to SEC regulation.   
The SEC was very careful to build a strong foundation supporting the 
argument that ICOs sold securities subject to its jurisdiction. It chose cases 
where it could convincingly apply the basic principles of Howey. Rather 
than insist on a penalty, it often offered the opportunity to settle the case 
with only a promise to refrain from violating the law in the future. It issued 
detailed explanations for why particular token sales involved securities that 
could serve as a roadmap for the industry. Rather than bringing hundreds of 
similar cases, the SEC instead focused on bringing a small number of high-
impact cases.       
This selective enforcement strategy was enabled in part by the knowledge 
that other enforcers could supplement the SEC’s work.60 Purchasers of 
tokens could bring civil suits seeking a refund and rely upon SEC 
enforcement releases to convince courts that such tokens were securities. 
Federal and state prosecutors could seek criminal and civil sanctions for 
some of the worst ICOs that basically involved simple theft. Decentralized 
 
 
59. One early enforcement case involved the investment of Bitcoin into a fund that claimed it 
would pay one percent each day to investors. See SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, 
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).  In that case, the security was the shares in the fund rather than the 
Bitcoin.  Id. at *2.   
60. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement of the securities laws gave the SEC the option of moving 
deliberately in responding to ICOs. 
In addition to developing the law through enforcement, the SEC has 
attempted to provide guidance with respect to when it considers tokens to 
be securities. However, such guidance has been unclear and there are still 
significant questions about the security status of ICOs. The difficulty of 
creating a simple test specifying when an ICO token is a security shows why 
some form of Regulation by Enforcement was a necessary part of the SEC’s 
approach. 
A. Enforcement 
1.SEC Enforcement 
a. Initial Efforts 
i. The DAO 
 
The SEC first asserted its jurisdiction over ICOs by issuing a report of 
investigation in the summer of 2017.61 The securities laws permit the SEC 
to issue a public report describing its findings from an investigation.62 
Issuing such a report allowed the SEC to test the waters with respect to a 
novel issue. The SEC could publish an extensive opinion-like discussion of 
the facts and relevant law rather than hope for an informed and favorable 
ruling from a court.  Such administrative guidance can effectively have the 
force of law. 
The Report detailed the SEC’s views on the DAO, a $150 million ICO 
fund that issued tokens to raise funds to invest in other blockchain projects.63 
The DAO was governed by a set of smart contracts built on the Ethereum 
platform permitting its investors to vote to fund proposals and choose when 
they received profits from its successful investments.64   
An investment fund is typically structured so that the investors rely on 
the efforts of investment advisers to generate profits, making the shares of 
the fund a security. The DAO token holders had a right to profit 
distributions, satisfying one element of the Howey test. But the DAO argued 
 
 
61. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017) [hereinafter DAO REPORT]. 
62. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (2012).  
63. DAO REPORT, supra note 61, at 3. 
64. Id. at 4. 
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that its investors did not rely on the efforts of others because it was a 
decentralized autonomous organization, which would operate on its own 
without central management.65 Entrepreneurs seeking funding from the fund 
would submit smart contract project proposals that DAO token holders 
would vote on.66 If the investors participated in the success of the fund by 
selecting its investments, they would not be relying on the efforts of 
“others.” Instead of passive shareholders, they would be more like partners 
participating in the venture.67 
The SEC concluded, however, that while on its face, the arrangement 
looked like a partnership, it was more similar to a limited partnership where 
the limited partners rely on the efforts of a general partner, making the 
limited partnership interests securities.68 A small group of individuals 
selected by the founders of the DAO controlled which projects could be put 
up for a vote.69 They had the “ultimate discretion as to whether or not to 
submit a proposal for voting” and “could impose subjective criteria for 
whether the proposal should be whitelisted.”70 Thus, the owners of DAO 
tokens relied substantially on the efforts of the project’s founders.71 
The DAO tokens differed from Bitcoin, which was launched through 
active participation from its initial investors. The first participants in Bitcoin 
earned currency through mining, essentially investing in the currency by 
spending computing power to verify transactions. Because they are both 
investors and participants in the venture, miners do not rely on the efforts 
of “others,” making it difficult to argue that they invested in a security.   
 
 
65. The DAO’s creators “took great pains to ensure that it was, in fact, decentralized.” Usha R. 
Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 700 (2019). 
66. DAO REPORT, supra note 61, at 2. 
67. General partnership interests have long been understood to not involve securities. In contrast, 
limited partnership interests have often been found to be securities because the limited partners do not 
participate in the partnership’s management. See, e.g., Masel v. Villarreal, 924 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 
2019) (explicating this distinction). 
68. Prior case law instructed that courts should investigate the substance of a potential investment 
contract rather than defer to its form. See United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008). 
69. DAO REPORT, supra note 61, at 10. 
70. Id. at 5. 
71. Id. at 11. The SEC also highlighted the difficulty of DAO token holders organizing to 
exercise control because of the dispersion of the tokens and difficulty of uncovering the identity of the 
holders. Id. at 11. This suggests that if an individual or group controlled a substantial percentage of DAO 
tokens, such tokens would be less likely to be a security.  
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In choosing the DAO for its first enforcement case, the SEC signaled that 
it was willing to delve into the details of ICOs and take positions on close 
cases. The determination that DAO tokens were securities rested on the 
contestable position that the ability of a small group to screen proposals 
meant that DAO token purchasers would  rely on the efforts of others.72 One 
could imagine a different version of the DAO that could potentially avoid 
classification as a security under Howey. Rather than pre-screen proposals, 
the founders could issue recommendations with respect to the proposals. 
Would token holders then have sufficient involvement with selecting 
investments in such an arrangement so they would not be relying on the 
efforts of “others”?  
Perhaps the DAO was targeted because it was associated with scandal. 
About a year before the SEC issued its report, a third of the Ether raised 
through the sale of DAO tokens was diverted to the account of an unknown 
attacker because of a flaw in the project’s code.73 The SEC’s initial interest 
was probably piqued by this high profile incident where investor assets were 
simply lost. 
The Ethereum Foundation facilitated a private ordering solution to the 
diversion. A consensus of participants on the network agreed to essentially 
erase the transactions where DAO tokens were stolen by starting a new 
chain that began before the theft.74 The SEC’s determination not to bring an 
enforcement case against the DAO may have been justified by the fact that 
private parties agreed to make investors whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
72. There are factual questions about the true extent of the powers of the DAO curators who 
whitelisted the various projects. See, e.g., Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: 
Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 940-43 (2018). 
73. Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World of 
Virtual Currency, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-50-
million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html [https://perma.cc/FN78-C5CK]. 
74. DAO REPORT, supra note 61, at 9. It took more than a month for the Ethereum community 
to come to a consensus about remedying the harm. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 33, at 188-89. 
Even then, this consensus was incomplete. A new cryptocurrency called “Ethereum Classic” was formed 
by those who split from the majority. See Matthew Beck, Into the Ether with Ethereum Classic, at 3 
(Mar. 2007) https://ethereumclassic.org/assets/etc-thesis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AMT-DMJR]. 
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ii. Munchee 
 
In addition to several cases seeking injunctions against clearly fraudulent 
ICOs,75 which typically did not generate lengthy opinions applying the 
Howey test, the DAO Report was followed by an SEC administrative release 
towards the end of 2017 directed at a token that did not give its owner the 
right to profits associated with a venture. The Munchee case involved a 
company with an app where individuals could write reviews of particular 
food dishes they ordered at a restaurant (rather than a general review of the 
restaurant).76 Munchee sought to issue a token that could be earned for 
writing a review and used to make “in-app” purchases and potentially food 
at participating restaurants.77  
Munchee was notable because it showed that even though a token could 
be used as a currency rather than an investment in a business, it could be a 
security if the promoter emphasized the token’s profit potential. The SEC’s 
complaint described the way that Munchee had marketed the possibility that 
the price of the tokens would appreciate.78 As the platform increased in 
popularity, Munchee might take tokens out of circulation, and the 
combination of demand and reduced supply would increase the price of the 
token. Investors would thus rely on the efforts of Munchee to increase the 
 
 
75. See, e.g., SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 17-7007, 2017 WL 6398722 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017) 
(granting preliminary injunction, asset freeze, and other interim relief); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Halts Alleged Initial Coin Offering Scam (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-8. These cases were spearheaded by the SEC’s new 
Cyber Unit focusing on securities law violations involving ICOs. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail 
Investors (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/5RXC-
L8HN]. In addition to bringing cases against issuers, the SEC brought cases against celebrities who 
promoted a fraudulent ICO for failing to disclose compensation they received for their services. See, 
e.g., Mayweather, Securities Act Release No. 10578, 2018 WL 6266203 (Nov. 29, 2018) (requiring 
disgorgement and $300,000 penalty); see also Khaled, Securities Act Release No. 10579, 2018 WL 
6266204 (Nov. 29, 2018) (requiring disgorgement and $100,000 penalty). Notably, claims by private 
parties against these celebrities seeking to hold them liable for the failure to register the securities have 
failed. See Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-Civ-Scola, 2019 WL 2085839 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 
2019). 
76. Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 2017 WL 10605969 (Dec. 11, 2017). 
77. Id. at *3; Sanjeev Verma, Nghi Bui & Chelsea Lam, Munchee Token: A Decentralized 
Blockchain Based Food Review/Rating Social Media Platform, THE VENTURE ALLEY (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theventurealley.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/24/2017/12/Munchee-White-Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J7Y6-ZGL2]. 
78. Munchee Inc., 2017 WL 10605969, at *4-*6. 
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value of their investment. Munchee was relevant to a wide number of ICOs 
that issued utility tokens conferring the right to access services or products.  
The Munchee release established that the way an ICO offers a token to 
the public is an important factor in assessing whether it must be registered 
as a security.79 As Howey noted, the Securities Act of 1933 not only 
prohibits the sale of unregistered securities, it also prohibits offering an 
investment opportunity with the basic characteristics of a security, even if 
the investor does not ultimately purchase a security. In Howey, it was 
“enough that the [defendants] merely offer[ed] the essential ingredients of 
an investment contract” for the registration requirement to be triggered.80 
The fact that some investors ended up buying an investment that was not 
technically a security did not excuse the violation because such investors 
were offered a security. In a case decided more than a decade before the 
ICO wave, “virtual shares” that were used as part of a fictional trading game 
were found to be investment contracts in part because of a representation 
that purchasers could “firmly expect a 10% profit monthly” on the 
investment.81 Even if the Munchee token was arguably not a security 
because it mainly offered access to a service, if it was offered with the 
“essential ingredients” of a security, SEC registration was required.   
Munchee had referenced the DAO Report in its white paper and 
proceeded on the belief that the token was a utility token that would not 
trigger Howey.82 After the SEC contacted it, the company discontinued the 
token and returned the proceeds within a few hours.83 Because of its prompt 
response and cooperation, the SEC did not require it to pay a penalty to 
resolve the case.84   
Unlike the DAO Report, Munchee set forth a fairly clear rule with respect 
to the distribution of ICOs. The promotion of the profit potential of a token, 
along with the promise by the venture to make efforts to increase the token’s 
value, would likely mean that the token is a security. 
 
 
79. See, e.g., Michael Segal, Cryptocurrency Regulation Under U.S. Securities Laws and 
Proposed Amendments, 26 PIABA B.J. 97, 112 (2019) (“Cryptocurrencies looking to raise capital who 
follow similar advertising practices will likely face similar scrutiny from the SEC.”). 
80. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
81. SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2001). 
82. Munchee Inc., 2017 WL 10605969, at *3. 
83. Id. at *6. 
84. Id. at *9. 
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b. A Second Wave of Enforcement 
 
For the next half a year, the SEC continued to actively investigate ICOs,85 
but did not announce significant enforcement settlements. The SEC seemed 
to be waiting to see how ICO markets had processed its earlier enforcement. 
Even after the DAO Report and Munchee release, the number of ICOs 
raising funds rose during the first half of 2018.86 
The most notable development was a speech by William Hinman, the 
head of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance, on the question of 
whether Ether is a security.87 That speech stated that a token would not be a 
security when “there is no longer any central enterprise being invested in.” 
Hinman noted that “current offers and sales of Ether are not securities 
transactions” because of the “decentralized structure” of the “Ethereum 
network.”88  
The speech took the position that for a network to be sufficiently 
decentralized to avoid security status, it must be functional in that 
“purchasers would no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry 
out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts.”89 Tokens associated 
with projects that might eventually become decentralized would not qualify. 
At the “outset” of a project, when “the business model and very viability of 
the application is still uncertain . . . [, t]he purchaser usually has no choice 
but to rely on the efforts of the promoter to build the network and make the 
 
 
85. It initiated over one hundred investigations of cryptocurrency organizations. See Dave 
Michaels, SEC Warns Investors on Cryptocurrency Exchanges, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2018, 4:15 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-warns-investors-on-cryptocurrency-exchanges-1520457355. 
86. There were 356 ICOs during the second half of 2017 (85 based in the U.S.) and 626 during 
the first half of 2018 (86 based in the U.S.). See Crypto Token Sales Market Statistics: July-December 
2017, All Types, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com/stats-
geo/ALL?dates=Jul%2001,%202017%20to%20Dec%2031,%202017 [https://perma.cc/G24A-826Y]; 
Crypto Token Sales Market Statistics: January-June 2018, All Types, COINSCHEDULE, 
https://www.coinschedule.com/stats-
geo/ALL?dates=Jan%2001,%202018%20to%20Jun%2030,%202018 [https://perma.cc/3YW6-5Z4N]. 
87. William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 
[https://perma.cc/VER4-5ZYY]. 
88. Id.  
89. Id.  
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enterprise a success.”90 It would thus fall within the Howey test because “the 
purchase of a token looks a lot like a bet on the success of the enterprise and 
not the purchase of something used to exchange for goods or services on the 
network.”91 
 
c. Penalties Without Fraud 
 
The Hinman speech’s position on Ether raised questions about the degree 
of functionality necessary for a network to be decentralized. In two 
settlements announced towards the end of 2018, the SEC sanctioned two 
projects with insufficient functionality for their tokens to avoid security 
status.92 The cases were significant because they were the first time the SEC 
imposed a significant penalty ($250,000) on a pair of ICOs where the only 
securities law violation was the failure to register the offering.  
The first case was against Paragon Coin, which raised twelve million 
dollars by selling tokens to the public through an ICO to fund new projects 
relating to the cannabis industry.93 Much of the funds were marked for “real-
estate acquisition” for “co-working spaces” that could be paid for with 
tokens.94 The Paragon Coin white paper highlighted the skills of 
management (its CEO was a former contestant on the Amazing Race),95 
showing that the value of the tokens was tied to the success of a management 
team.96  
The second case was against AirFox, which was seeking to develop a 
system where token purchasers could earn free cellular airtime or data by 
viewing advertisements on their phone and using such tokens for 
 
 
90. Id.  
91. Id.  
92. In addition, the SEC continued to bring cases against fraudulent ICOs. See, e.g., Tomahawk 
Expl. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10530, Exchange Act Release No. 83839, 2018 WL 3854604, at 
*5-*6 (Aug. 14, 2018) (describing false statements relating to acquisition of oil lease). The Tomahawk 
token was easily a security. As its white paper explained: “The more Tomahawkcoins owned, the more 
equity a person has in Tomahawk Exploration.” TOMAHAWK EXPL. LLC, TOMAHAWKCOIN WHITE 
PAPER 3 (2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3p647q2sdaEUjJGQTNjMDlIckU/view 
[https://perma.cc/9KKR-G868].  
93. Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10574, 2016 WL 6017663 (Nov. 16, 2018). 
94. Id. at *3. 
95. PARAGON, WHITEPAPER VERSION 1.0 34 (2017), https://icosbull.com/eng/ico/paragon-
coin/whitepaper [https://perma.cc/DUS2-5B98] (hereinafter PARAGON WHITEPAPER). 
96. Paragon Coin, 2018 WL 6017663, at *6. 
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payments.97 The tokens would be used to build this functionality and like 
Paragon Coin, AirFox highlighted the quality of its management.   
In both cases, the SEC emphasized the fact that the underlying blockchain 
project was not completely operational. The Paragon Coin venture was a 
vague promise to use blockchain to support cannabis sales. The SEC noted 
that “no one was able to buy any good or service” with the token at the time 
of the offering.98 The Paragon Coin white paper linked the value of the 
tokens to Paragon Coin’s ability to complete the planned project.99 AirFox 
had only developed a basic digital wallet application where funds could be 
transferred between mobile phones prior to the ICO. The tokens were sold 
to “enhance the functionality of the wallet, allowing users to choose 
between a broader [arr]ay of services.”100 While the token purchasers agreed 
they were buying the token for their utility, the app was only a prototype 
without “any real users.”101  
Like the Munchee case, both projects emphasized the profit potential of 
the tokens. The Paragon Coin white paper noted that the token was 
“designed to appreciate in value.”102 The AirFox token was not marketed to 
potential users but to investors.103 
These two cases established that even tokens that could eventually be 
used primarily to access a service could be securities if: (1) the proceeds 
from their sale would be used to build the service; and (2) the tokens were 
marketed for their profit potential. Furthermore, the SEC showed it was 
willing to punish companies that sold such tokens without complying with 
the securities laws. Because many ICOs were based on a model similar to 
that of Paragon Coin and AirFox, it was now clear that many ICOs could 
not proceed without registration or an exemption.  
 
 
 
 
 
97. Carriereq, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10575, 2018 WL 6017664 (Nov. 16, 2018). 
98. Paragon Coin, 2018 WL 6017663, at *4. 
99. Id. at *6. 
100. AIRFOX, AIRTOKEN: A TOKEN TO POWER MORE INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES 10 (Apr. 
3, 2019), https://airfox.com/images/uploads/airtoken-white-paper-updated-april-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YGV-2LSX]. 
101. Carriereq, Inc., 2018 WL 6017664, at *3.  
102. PARAGON WHITEPAPER, supra note 95, at 30. 
103. AIRFOX, supra note 100, at 16. 
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d. Intermediaries 
 
In addition to enforcement involving ICOs, the SEC announced several 
settlements involving cryptocurrency intermediaries in autumn 2018. A 
couple of cases were brought against exchanges that facilitated token 
transactions.104  Because any securities exchange must register with the 
SEC,105 a token exchange is subject to SEC jurisdiction if some of the tokens 
trading on it are securities. In addition to exchanges, a case was brought 
against an investment fund that raised money from public investors to 
purchase tokens.106 To the extent that some of the tokens the fund invests in 
are securities, the fund must also comply with registration requirements.   
Token exchanges were especially important to the SEC’s efforts to 
protect retail investors from fraudulent token sales because they permitted 
individuals to exchange traditional currency for digital assets.107 At least 
initially, much of the investment in ICOs was by investors who had the good 
fortune to invest in Bitcoin at a low price and could reinvest their Bitcoin 
gains in tokens. Because Bitcoin’s price has fluctuated significantly, an 
investor’s gains in Bitcoin were at risk regardless of whether he reinvested 
those gains in tokens or held on to his Bitcoin investment. 
The SEC faced the challenge of moving against intermediaries 
facilitating investments in tokens that were likely securities but had not been 
determined to be securities by a court or even through a prior enforcement 
action. The SEC dealt with this issue in its case against TokenLot by not 
specifying which of the tokens traded on the exchange were securities, and 
instead declaring vaguely that it “sold digital tokens that included securities 
under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the 
 
 
104. See, e.g., TokenLot, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10543, Exchange Act Release No. 
84075, Investment Company Act Release No. 33221, 2018 WL 4329662 (Sept. 11, 2018); Coburn, 
Exchange Act Release No. 84554, 2018 WL 5840155 (Nov. 8, 2018). 
105. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2018). 
106. Crypto Asset Management, LP, Securities Act Release No. 10544, 2018 WL 4329663 (Sept. 
11, 2018). 
107. Cryptocurrency exchanges facilitate coin and token trades between users.  Exchanges can 
also facilitate transactions between fiat currencies and cryptocurrencies, which allow many new users to 
make their first purchases of Ether. Exchanges also manage the holdings of digital assets for users. 
Where Can I Find the Keys for My Wallet?, COINBASE, 
https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/1526452-where-can-i-find-the-private-keys-for-
my-wallet [https://perma.cc/SKW6-2E6D]. 
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Exchange Act.”108 TokenLot and its founders were required to disgorge 
profits and its founders each were subject to a civil penalty.109 Similarly, the 
SEC generally alleged that a digital asset investment fund, Crypto Asset 
Management, was “in the business of investing, holding, and trading certain 
digital assets that were investment securities” without specifying which of 
those assets were securities.110 Crypto Asset Management and its founder 
also agreed to pay a penalty.111 
 
e. Pending Enforcement 
 
After the Paragon Coin and AirFox cases, the SEC’s major enforcement 
efforts quieted again for about six months. The silence was broken by the 
announcement that the SEC had filed a complaint against a messaging 
company, Kik.112 Earlier, Kik had submitted an extensive response to an 
SEC Wells Notice informing it that charges might be filed against it. Kik 
argued against enforcement with respect to its ICO token (which it called 
the Kin token) that would fund a decentralized ecosystem where token 
owners could purchase services on its messaging platform.113 It argued that 
any increase in the token’s value would be linked to the efforts of the token 
purchasers, who would have incentive to increase activity on the 
platform.114 
The SEC strongly denied this characterization in its complaint.115 It 
argued that the one-hundred-million-dollar token sale was motivated by the 
poor performance of Kik’s core messaging business. It was thus akin to a 
 
 
108. TokenLot, 2018 WL 4329662, at *2. 
109. Id. at *7. 
110. Crypto Asset Management, 2018 WL 4329663, at *2. 
111. Id. at *4. 
112. SEC Charges Issuer with Conducting $100 Million Unregistered ICO, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-87 [https://perma.cc/K3J4-KR2Q]. 
113. See Wells Submission of Kik Interactive, Inc., supra note 13. One example of such a service 
would be access to premium VIP groups. See also Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem of Digital Services 
for Daily Life, KIK INTERACTIVE, INC. (May 2017), 
https://www.kin.org/static/files/Kin_Whitepaper_V1_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XNQ-YH6Y]. 
114. See Wells Submission of Kik Interactive, Inc., supra note 13, at 6. 
115. Complaint, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 19-cv-5244 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2019), ECF No. 
1. [hereinafter Kik Complaint]. 
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securities sale to fund a declining business.116 The SEC argued that Kik 
highlighted the profit potential of the token and its efforts to create a 
successful product.117 
Perhaps with the Hinman speech in mind, Kik had produced a basic 
version of the new app. It argued that unlike other ICOs, it had created a 
“minimum viable product” that was functional.118 But the SEC argued that 
this app was far from functional because it was only capable of producing 
an emoji of a cartoon honey badger.119 The SEC also noted that an earlier 
private placement to institutional investors set an aggressive timetable for 
the ICO to the general public that resulted in a public distribution before the 
project was complete.120 
Finally, rather than being managed through a decentralized network, a 
foundation was formed to support the cryptocurrency.121 A substantial 
percentage of the Kin token was issued to Kik, giving the company an 
incentive to orchestrate an increase in the price of the token.122 
 
2. Other Enforcers 
 
The SEC has not been alone in policing ICOs. Its efforts have been 
supplemented by other government actors and private investors in tokens. 
Some of these cases have generated judicial rulings on the issue of whether 
ICOs involve securities.  
The SEC enforcement cases that have provided extensive guidance on 
when a token is a security have generally not involved outright frauds. ICOs 
involving simple theft or self-dealing have often been targeted by other 
government entities.123 Many of the cases involved simple fact patterns 
where the token clearly had the characteristics of a security. State regulators 
 
 
116. Id. at 3. Kik had argued that the token was sold not to raise funds but to create a broad 
community. See Wells Submission of Kik Interactive, Inc., supra note 13, at 10. 
117. Kik Complaint, supra note 115, at 29-39.  
118. See Wells Submission of Kik Interactive, Inc., supra note 13, at 11. 
119. Kik Complaint, supra note 115, at 26-28. 
120. Id. at 24. 
121. Id. at 13. 
122. Id. at 30-31. 
123. Addressing unjust enrichment by individuals is an important goal of securities law. See James 
J. Park, Rule 10B-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345 (2010). 
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have brought dozens of cases, typically citing state securities laws.124 In the 
fall of 2018, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) filed a 
complaint against a broker-dealer who sold tokens said to be “backed by 
marketable securities.”125 Federal prosecutors also brought a criminal case 
against an individual who sold cryptocurrencies which he falsely said would 
be backed by real assets that he would select, namely real estate and 
diamonds.126 The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
indictment, holding that a jury could find that the cryptocurrencies were 
securities.  
Securities class actions have presented some more challenging 
applications of securities law.127 Purchasers of major cryptocurrencies such 
as Tezos and Ripple have filed such suits.128 Tezos is associated with a new 
smart contract-supporting blockchain platform (like Ethereum) with a 
formal updating process that allows for the platform to self-amend.129 
 
 
124. See, e.g., Crystal Token, slip op at 5, (N.D. Sec. Dep’t Oct. 1, 2018) (seeking penalty for ICO 
promising up to two-percent daily return), 
http://www.nd.gov/securities/sites/default/files/enforcement/Crystal%20Token%20Cease%20and%20
Desist%20Order%20and%20Certificate%20of%20Service%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ESU5-WFLY]; 
DavorCoin, No. ENF-18-CDO-1757, 2018 WL 818566, at *1 (Tex. State Sec. Bd. Feb. 2, 2018) 
(targeting scheme promising up to forty-eight percent monthly return for lending token); Global Pay 
Net, No. 2018-CDS-052, 2018 WL 6592762, at *1 (Colo. Div. Sec. Aug. 10, 2018) (alleging fraud 
against ICO funding international financial platform); Pink Ribbon ICO, No. E-2018-0029, 2018 WL 
1616678 (Mass. Sec. Div. Mar. 27, 2018) (stopping ICO purporting to support women and families 
facing financial burdens from cancer). 
125. Dep’t of Enf’t v. Ayre, Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2016049307801 (FINRA Sept. 11, 
2018). 
126. U.S. v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339, at *2-4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 
2018). 
127. They have also resulted in findings that tokens are securities with respect to simple fact 
patterns. See, e.g., Beranger v. Harris, Order, No. 1:18-CV-05054-CAP, slip op at 6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 
2019) (sufficiently alleging that tokens relating to the funding of an online entertainment platform 
qualified as securities); Solis v. Latium Network, Inc., No. 18-10255, 2018 WL 6445543, at *2-*3 
(D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2018) (sufficiently alleging that tokens for a tasking platform qualified as securities). 
128. In litigation involving Tezos, a court rejected personal jurisdiction and extraterritoriality 
arguments raised by the defendants. See In re Tezos Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-06779-RS, 2018 WL 
4293341, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018). In the Ripple litigation, early proceedings have determined 
that the case will be decided in federal rather than state court. See Coffey v. Ripple Labs Inc., 333 F. 
Supp. 3d 952, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
129. L.M. GOODMAN, TEZOS-A SELF-AMENDING CRYPTO-LEDGER WHITE PAPER (2014), 
https://tezos.com/static/white_paper-2dc8c02267a8fb86bd67a108199441bf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C4ZN-T3BY]. 
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Ripple is a blockchain platform built for traditional financial institutions.130 
These cases have not yet generated any major decisions applying the Howey 
test, but may do so in the future.  
Perhaps the most notable decision arose out of a class action by 
purchasers of a token called ATB Coin.131 They brought claims in the 
Southern District of New York under section 12 of the Securities Act of 
1933, arguing for rescission. ATBCOIN LLC raised funds to develop a 
system for making payments that would be more efficient than other 
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.132 Under the principles set forth in the 
Hinman speech, such a project had the potential to escape security status if 
it became sufficiently decentralized.133 However, the district court found 
that at the time of its ICO, ATB Coin was a security. Citing the SEC’s 
Munchee release, the court noted that a formal distribution of profits to 
token holders was not a prerequisite for token status.134 The court cited the 
marketing campaign for ATB Coin, which highlighted the profit potential 
of the digital currency.135 It found that the plaintiff-investors relied on the 
efforts of others because the “success of ATB Coins was entirely dependent 
on Defendants’ following through on their promise to launch and improve 
the ATB Blockchain.”136 When it did not deliver, “the value of the ATB 
Coins plummeted.”137  
The ATBCOIN case broke new ground because at the time, the SEC had 
never brought an enforcement action against an ICO funding the 
development of a new payment system that aspired to become like Bitcoin. 
ATBCOIN thus shows that while the securities laws do not regulate 
established cryptocurrencies, they will now be a consideration for those who 
wish to fund new cryptocurrencies through public sales. 
 
 
130. DAVID SCHWARTZ ET AL., THE RIPPLE PROTOCOL CONSENSUS ALGORITHM (2018), 
https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV9X-W2JA]. RIPPLE, 
SOLUTION OVERVIEW, https://ripple.com/files/ripple_solutions_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD7Y-
VCQC]. 
131. Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC, 380 F. Supp. 3d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
132. Id. at 347. 
133. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
134. Balestra, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 354. 
135. Id. at 355. 
136. Id. at 355-56. 
137. Id. at 356. 
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Private parties have also brought concurrent cases against entities 
targeted by SEC enforcement. For example, in addition to its SEC case, 
Paragon Coin is facing a securities class action by token purchasers seeking 
rescission.138 This private suit alleged not only that the tokens were 
securities sold without registration, but that funds were misappropriated to 
solicit other investors and enrich the promoter.139 
 
B. Guidance 
 
In addition to enforcement documents, the SEC staff has attempted to 
provide guidance to the industry with respect to when a token is a security. 
Various staff members have given notable speeches clarifying the SEC’s 
approach. As noted earlier, a June 2018 speech by Corporate Finance 
Director Hinman took the position that Ether was not a security. A 
September 2018 speech by the co-head of the SEC’s Enforcement Division 
reviewed recent cases and noted the “need to protect investors from [the] 
risks [associated with ICOs] while balancing the potential this technology 
could have for capital formation.”140 It explained how “the Enforcement 
Division has approached ICO and digital asset matters—with a focus on 
bringing cases that deliver broad messages and have an impact beyond the 
individual cases.”141 
The SEC’s most notable effort to provide clarity has been its publication 
of a Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets.142 
This document discussed the Howey test and its potential application to 
tokens. Unsurprisingly, rather than provide a simple framework, the 
document discussed a wide range of factors that might be considered in 
 
 
138. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 7, Holland v. Paragon Coin, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-
00671-JSW (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2019), ECF No. 101. 
139. Id. 
140. Stephanie Avakian, Measuring the Impact of the SEC’s Enforcement Program, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-avakian-092018 
[https://perma.cc/7AFT-XN9X]. 
141. Id. 
142. Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
(April 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets 
[https://perma.cc/HLC8-5WMQ]. 
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determining whether a token is a security.143 For example, the section 
describing “reliance on the efforts of others” contained twenty different 
bullet points, while noting that “[a]lthough no one of the following 
characteristics is necessarily determinative, the stronger their presence, the 
more likely it is that a purchaser of a digital asset is relying on the ‘efforts 
of others.’”144 
The SEC also published a no-action letter where it determined that a 
token sold by TurnKey Jet was a utility token. The TurnKey Jet token could 
be used to access a “fully developed and operational” air charter service that 
would be “immediately usable” and “marketed in a manner that emphasizes 
the functionality of the Token, and not the potential for the increase in the 
market value of the Token.”145 
Though somewhat helpful in setting the outer boundaries for the 
definition of a security, the SEC’s guidance has done little to help provide 
meaningful clarity with respect to close cases. Enforcement is essential in 
illustrating how various factors will be weighed by the SEC. 
 
III. EVALUATING REGULATION BY SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
 
About two years after it released the DAO Report, the SEC appears to 
have brought unregistered ICOs under control. It did so without sparking 
substantial criticism that it had unduly hindered entrepreneurship. Though 
it has largely been successful, there are also potential problems with the 
SEC’s approach. This Part discusses some of the lessons that can be drawn 
from the SEC’s Regulation by Selective Enforcement strategy. 
 
A. The Effectiveness of Selective Enforcement 
 
For at least the foreseeable future, the law on whether a token is a security 
will largely be defined by the DAO Report and the various SEC settlement 
releases. The SEC’s enforcement efforts generated extensive, fact-specific 
 
 
143. The SEC took a similar approach with respect to defining when financial misstatements are 
material. See, e.g., James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 
513, 526-28 (2009). 
144. Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, supra note 142. 
145. Turnkey Jet, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 1471132 (Apr. 3, 2019). 
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analysis of particular ICOs much more quickly than the judicial system. 
Litigation can take years and most cases will settle before a judge can issue 
a decision.  
By pursuing selective enforcement, the SEC was able to devote time to 
cases with complex fact patterns requiring sophisticated analysis to resolve. 
Though it brought only a small handful of ICO cases, those cases generated 
extensive analysis on the application of the Howey test. The quality of 
enforcement can be more important than its quantity.146 The lengthy 
discussion of the facts and law detailed in the SEC’s pronouncements show 
that they were the result of a thoughtful application of the SEC’s expertise 
and deserve some deference by the courts.147 Indeed, federal courts have 
cited the SEC releases in court rulings finding that certain ICOs involved 
securities.148 
Selective enforcement also permitted the SEC to wait and see how a 
quickly moving industry was developing. By waiting some time to impose 
serious penalties on unregistered ICOs, the SEC largely avoided the 
criticism that it was prematurely squelching entrepreneurship before it could 
develop. After some time, it became clear that there are challenges in 
developing successful blockchain projects. Many ICOs involved outright 
frauds or poorly conceptualized ideas with little chance of success. If ICOs 
had generated dozens of worthwhile ventures, the SEC might have adjusted 
its enforcement approach. 
The SEC’s experience with ICOs shows that in certain circumstances, it 
can effectively regulate without bringing a large number of enforcement 
cases. The SEC can quickly establish a legal framework through a small 
number of high-quality settlement releases that put an industry on notice 
about the agency’s expectations. 
 
 
 
 
146. As Professor Velikonja has shown, SEC reports on the number of cases it brings can be 
misleading. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement 
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2016). 
147. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting that the “weight” of an 
administrative interpretation “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). 
148. See, e.g., Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC, 380 F. Supp. 3d 340, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing 
SEC’s Munchee order). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
PARK ARTICLE 
3/31/2020 
 
128                                   Journal of Law & Policy                          [Vol. 61 
 
 
B. The Dangers of Selective Enforcement 
 
While it was effective in asserting control over ICOs, there are also 
reasons to question the SEC’s Regulation by Selective Enforcement 
strategy. 
Because it determines whether the SEC has jurisdiction, the issue of 
whether an investment is a security deserves careful scrutiny. Ideally, 
review by impartial judges would ensure that the SEC’s position is correct 
and the agency is not exceeding its authority. In at least one case, a federal 
court initially concluded that the SEC had not sufficiently established that 
an ICO involved the sale of a security.149 The court later reversed its 
order,150 but the episode raised the possibility that the SEC is not infallible 
in its assessment of the facts. On the other hand, Congress made the 
definition of a security expansive, giving the SEC broad authority over a 
wide range of investments. If the SEC obviously reached beyond its 
jurisdiction, defendants would litigate and courts would check any abuse. 
Despite the care with which it has drafted guidance, reports, and 
settlement releases, there is still significant ambiguity about when a token 
will be considered a security. As noted earlier, the DAO Report found that 
the power of a central group to approve projects was enough to conclude 
that token investors relied on the efforts of “others.”151 But this was a close 
call. One could argue that the investors were more actively involved than 
the limited partner of a typical investment fund. Yet this issue was never 
litigated because the SEC did not bring a case against the DAO. Because 
the DAO did not face a sanction, it did not have the incentive to fully test 
the SEC’s theories in court. 
Rather than squarely acknowledging the confusing state of the law, the 
SEC has recently taken the position that the law is clear enough that ICO 
entrepreneurs should be subject to sanction. In the complaint filed against 
Kik, the SEC cited its issuance of the DAO Report as a reason to conclude 
that Kik should have been aware that its tokens needed to be registered.152 
 
 
149. See SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB, 2018 WL 6181408 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 
2018) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
150. See SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB, 2019 WL 625163 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 
2019) (order granting plaintiff’s motion for partial reconsideration). 
151. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
152. Kik Complaint, supra note 115, at 6, 28-29. 
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This is a troubling position given that the DAO Report’s conclusion relied 
upon fine factual distinctions that were resolved by the SEC itself.153 
The fact that the SEC was able to piece together a string of settlements in 
cases where defendants were not willing to fight does not mean that the 
issue of when a token is a security has been resolved. For example, consider 
a situation where the project being funded is close to finished. Would the 
project be functional enough so that its tokens are not securities? The SEC’s 
enforcement actions have all involved tokens that were promoted for their 
investment potential. What if a project is not yet functional but there are no 
marketing efforts promising investment returns?154 The SEC has made 
progress through its selective enforcement program, but there are still 
substantial gaps in the law.155   
Because it is not comprehensive, selective enforcement can result in the 
uneven distribution of regulatory burdens. Consider the example of 
Ethereum. Because it did an ICO and established a successful platform 
before the SEC targeted ICOs, Ether was able to evolve into a coin that is 
considered to be a currency rather than a security. While the SEC has 
essentially taken the position that Ether is currently not a security, it is 
unclear why it is not. The value of Ether fluctuates based on the performance 
of the Ethereum platform. The more projects that choose to launch on the 
platform, the greater the demand for the Ether necessary for those projects 
 
 
153. The SEC’s position may reflect an attempt to punish those companies that seek to resist its 
enforcement. In contrast, a company that voluntarily reported its violations was able to settle its case 
without penalty. See Gladius Network LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10608, 2019 WL 697993 (Feb. 
20, 2019). A company that halted its ICO before sales were made also escaped penalty. See SimplyVital 
Health, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10671, 2019 WL 3780055 (Aug. 12, 2019). 
154. Experience has shown that ICOs highlight their profit potential in their marketing material. 
For a decentralized blockchain community to flourish, individuals need an incentive to invest resources 
in that community. 
155. Another challenge is that blockchain projects do not fit neatly within the disclosure regulation 
envisioned by the securities laws. Unlike an initial public offering for a traditional company, ICOs do 
not necessarily fund projects that are expected to generate earnings over time. Chris Brummer, Trevor 
I. Kiviat & Jai Massari, What Should Be Disclosed in an Initial Coin Offering?, in CRYPTOASSETS: 
LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (Chris Brummer ed., 2019). While disclosure at 
the initial stages of a blockchain project can inform investors about the probability that the project will 
eventually be functional, it is unclear whether continuing disclosure would be useful after the project is 
functional. If the blockchain project is truly decentralized at some point, its tokens may no longer be 
considered securities. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. Thus, disclosure might be 
appropriate for an ICO, but periodic disclosure obligations could cease once sufficient decentralization 
has been achieved. 
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to function. To continue to attract projects, the Ethereum network must 
continue to evolve and improve. Though it does not have a central 
management team, the Ethereum Foundation remains the guiding force for 
maintaining the network and improving it.156 Ethereum might pass what 
Professors Henderson and Raskin call the “Bahamas Test,” where the 
“project is still capable of existing” even though the sellers have “fled to the 
Bahamas.”157 But to the extent that the continued value of Ether depends on 
improvements by a central entity, there is an argument that Ether should be 
considered a security.158  
A consequence of the SEC’s efforts against ICOs is that early entrants 
will be protected by a barrier to entry. The framework set forth in Hinman’s 
speech only provides a narrow way for tokens associated with 
entrepreneurial projects to avoid security status. They must be associated 
with a system that is sufficiently functional so that it is run by a 
decentralized community of miners and users. As one of the authors of this 
Article noted in an earlier paper, the Hinman framework presents a paradox. 
A token can be distributed without regulation by the securities laws if it is 
functional, but many tokens “are only functional if they are distributed 
widely enough so that a decentralized system arises.”159 In a recent 
complaint against a company that sought to develop a currency that could 
be transferred through its messaging app, the SEC acknowledged that wide 
distribution of a token is required for a decentralized community to arise. It 
explained: “Defendants knew . . . that to actually implement the TON 
Blockchain in the real world, the project would require ‘numerosity’: a 
 
 
156. Indeed, the price of Ether plummeted upon a false report of the death of its founder. See Nick 
Paumgarten, The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2018, at 72-73.  
157. M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: Toward 
an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs and Other Digital Assets, 2019 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 443, 461 (2019). 
158. Major changes to the underlying Ethereum protocol or changes to the blockchain ledger 
require that the entire network reach a consensus. While individual users have the option to join an 
updated protocol or reject it, the Ethereum Foundation is highly influential in orchestrating updates. 
Users who don’t follow the majority risk being left behind or diluting their cryptocurrency’s worth. After 
funds were diverted from the DAO, the Ethereum Foundation was fundamental in reversing the 
transactions. 
159. James J. Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed, LOWELL 
MILKEN INST. POLICY REPORT (2018), https://lowellmilkeninstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/When-are-Tokens-Securities.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5EH-CW3C]. 
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widespread distribution [of its token] across the globe.”160 Unless an ICO 
project is functional without wide distribution, the Hinman framework does 
not provide an avenue for a token to avoid classification as a security. Under 
the Hinman paradox, it is unlikely that the path available to Ethereum, 
which did an initial public distribution of Ether, will be available to new 
ambitious blockchain projects, which will need to register their tokens with 
the SEC or find an exemption to the securities laws.   
For better or worse, as a result of the SEC’s efforts, rather than being 
developed by entrepreneurs, new blockchain projects in the U.S. will be 
more likely to be financed by large corporations such as Facebook and 
JPMorgan. The prospect of large technology and banking companies 
controlling digital asset networks creates the risk of undue concentration of 
power over the technology in a few large corporations. Resolving a threat 
to investors may result in problems that other regulators will have to address 
in the future.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the last several decades, the SEC’s most visible enforcement efforts 
have targeted securities fraud and insider trading relating to established 
public corporations. As a national regulator, the SEC focused its limited 
resources on misconduct that threatened the integrity of national markets. 
Efforts to protect retail investors from novel investment schemes, while 
important, did not define the SEC’s national reputation.  
The sudden rise of the ICO was unique because it not only raised issues 
of investor protection but threatened to eventually disrupt the scheme 
regulating public offerings. While technology has often affected securities 
markets, the ability to easily sell digital assets to willing investors could 
radically change the ability of entrepreneurs to raise funds. The sheer 
amounts raised through unregistered ICOs reflected the possibility that a 
new economy that would escape regulation would arise. 
The most effective way of addressing the problem of ICOs was through 
enforcement of well-established standards in individual cases. Rulemaking 
cannot provide clear answers to questions such as the precise degree of 
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control that must be retained by an ICO’s promoters for a token to be a 
security. The SEC needed to apply the Howey test to concrete situations, but 
it could not wait years for cases to wind through the courts.  
The SEC thus utilized a strategy of Regulation by Selective Enforcement. 
It carefully chose the right cases in building a foundation of decisions that 
supported its claim that most tokens were securities. It made a significant 
concession in taking the position that Ether was not a security despite a 
substantial argument that its value depends on the success of the Ethereum 
platform, which is maintained by an entity. It defined two types of practices 
that would likely trigger classification as a security—the use of token 
proceeds to complete a project and highlighting the profit potential of the 
token. It did not insist on penalties in many of its initial settlements, but 
gradually imposed penalties on ICOs that did not clearly involve a fraud. 
Without the assistance of private securities class actions and state 
securities regulators, the SEC’s work would have been much more difficult. 
Because investors can help themselves, the SEC did not have to devote as 
many resources responding to ICOs that would likely harm public investors. 
Instead, it could focus on cases that would develop its understanding of the 
Howey test. 
Despite the general success of its ICO efforts, the SEC should 
acknowledge that many questions remain with respect to when a digital 
asset is a security. For some ICOs, there could be a substantial argument 
that the Howey test does not apply. Rather than deem the issue resolved, the 
SEC has more work to do in clarifying the boundaries of its jurisdiction.
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